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INTRODUCTION 
[1] Education is one of the most important functions of the 
government.1  Because public schools are under the control of state and 
local authorities,2 the administrators and teachers of these schools are 
subject to requirements established in the United States Constitution.  For 
example, for more than thirty years, the Supreme Court has supported the 
due process rights3 of students facing a deprivation of liberty and property 
interests in education.4   
 
                                                                                                                         
∗
 J.D. Candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, 2010; S.M., Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 2004; Technical Advisor in Patent Litigation, Morrison & 
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its clients.  This article originated from a paper for a seminar taught by Adjunct Professor 
Daniel Brenner, who provided helpful guidance throughout many earlier drafts.  The 
author would like to thank her mother, Cindy Ho, for providing so many opportunities to 
reach for the stars. 
1
 See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
2
 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975) (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 
97, 104 (1968). 
3
 U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
4
 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 574. 
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[2] First Amendment5 or free speech jurisprudence has been constantly 
evolving in the context of school settings.6  While the Supreme Court first 
held that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”7 it later held that First 
Amendment protections for students “are not automatically coextensive 
with the rights of adults in other settings.”8  This is because protections 
afforded to students through the First Amendment are contorted and 
limited by the special characteristics inherent in a school environment.9  
Although administrators and teachers, as agents of the government, cannot 
“censor similar speech outside the school,” the Court has determined that a 
school does not have to “tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with 
its ‘basic educational mission.’”10   
[3] Use of the Internet as a medium for students to voice their opinions 
adds new “spins” in the legal analysis of student speech cases.11  While the 
Supreme Court held in the landmark decision of Reno v. ACLU that 
Internet speech is protected speech by the First Amendment,12 many 
 
                                                                                                                         
5
 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . .”). 
6
 See Thomas Fischer, The Law and Education: Supreme Court Doctrine Reaches 
Critical Mass, 13 MISS. C. L. REV. 287, 288-90 (1993) (discussing the evolution of 
school law). 
7
 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).   
8
 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
9
  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.   
10
 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (holding that the school 
did not violate the student’s First Amendment rights by censoring his articles on the 
student newspaper because it was reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns) 
(quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685). 
11
 Michael J. O’Connor, School Speech in the Internet Age: Do Students Shed Their 
Rights When They Pick Up a Mouse?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 459, 477 (2009). 
12
 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997). 
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questions remain with regard to cyberspace law behind schoolhouse gates.  
For example, if schools may censor a lewd or substantially disruptive 
student speech delivered at a school assembly or published in the school 
newspaper, may schools similarly censor a lewd or substantially disruptive 
student speech that occurred on the Internet?13  If so, under what 
circumstance is it permissible for a school to exercise this authority, and 
what standard should the court apply in adjudicating these cases?  This 
comment aims to address these questions. 
[4] Part I of this article reviews the three standards the U.S. Supreme 
Court set out for limiting First Amendment protection of student speech.14  
Part II compares the application of these three standards to two recent 
student speech cases15 and argues that courts inadequately apply these pre-
Internet legal limits to cases arising from student speech on the Internet.  
Part III addresses various viewpoints on the issue of student Internet 
speech and proposes a new standard for resolving such cases. 
I.  PRE-INTERNET STANDARDS FOR STUDENT SPEECH 
[5] Before the age of the Internet, the Supreme Court handed down 
three landmark decisions regarding student speech: Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District,16 Bethel School District No. 403 
v. Fraser,17 and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.18  These cases 
articulate three different standards regarding student speech.   
 
                                                                                                                         
13
 See O’Connor, supra note 11, at 472. 
14
 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (articulating a lewdness standard); Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 
276 (articulating a school curriculum standard); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (articulating a 
“substantial disruption” standard). 
15
 See generally Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp.2d. 1175 (E.D. Mo. 
1998); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002). 
16
 393 U.S. 503.   
17478 U.S. 675. 
18484 U.S. 260. 
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A.  THE SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION STANDARD 
[6] Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District is a 
landmark decision regarding student free speech.19  Tinker arose from the 
suspension of three students for wearing black armbands on school 
grounds in protest of the Vietnam War.20  The Court held that student 
speech that interferes “materially and substantially” with a school’s ability 
to educate or affects “the rights of others” was not protected by the First 
Amendment.21  The Court explained, however, that a student’s right to 
freedom of expression cannot be defeated by “undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance” or “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort 
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”22  
Noting that “[s]chool officials do not possess absolute authority over their 
students,” the Court concluded: “In the absence of a specific showing of 
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled 
to freedom of expression of their views.”23   
B.  THE LEWDNESS STANDARD 
[7] The Supreme Court limited the liberal reach of Tinker in Bethel 
School District No. 403 v. Fraser.24  In Fraser, the school suspended a 
student for delivering a sexually explicit speech at a school assembly.25  
While the Court ultimately determined that a school may regulate a 
 
                                                                                                                         
19
 See 393 U.S. at 505-06. 
20
 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
21
 Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)); see id. at 514 
(finding the wearing of black armbands did not interfere with the school’s work or with 
the rights of other students to be left alone). 
22
 Id. at 508-09. 
23
 Id. at 511. 
24
 See generally 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
25
 Id. at 677-78. 
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student speech that is vulgar or lewd,26 it cautioned that freedom to 
“advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms 
must be balanced against the society’s countervailing interest in teaching 
students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”27  This pivotal 
decision gave school officials the constitutional authority to punish 
students for their speech, even though that same speech, if made by an 
adult, would be protected outside the school’s gates.28    
C.  THE SCHOOL CURRICULUM STANDARD 
[8] The Court continued to narrow the scope of Tinker in Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier.29  In Kuhlmeier, two student articles were 
withheld from publication in the school newspaper; one dealt with “the 
impact of divorce on students at the school,” and the other discussed 
“students’ experiences with pregnancy.”30  The principal withheld 
publication because he thought the articles were inappropriate for younger 
students and because he was concerned about the anonymity of the 
students interviewed in the articles.31 
 
                                                                                                                         
26
 Id. at 685-86 (holding that the school district did not violate the student’s First 
Amendment rights by suspending him based on a speech he had made at a school-
sponsored event because the speech contained elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual 
metaphors). 
27
 Id. at 681 (“Even the most heated political discourse in a democratic society requires 
consideration for the personal sensibilities of the other participants and audiences.”). But 
see id. at 692 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“As the Court of Appeals noted, there “is no 
evidence in the record indicating that any students found the speech to be offensive.'”) 
(quoting Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1361 n.4 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
28
 See Carol M. Schwetschenau, Note, Constitutional Protection for Student Speech in 
Public High Schools: Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986), 
55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1349, 1364 (1987). 
29
 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
30
 Id. at 263. 
31
 See id. at 263-64. 
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[9] The Court held that when a newspaper is part of a school 
curriculum, rather than a public forum, the content therein is subject to 
greater control by school administrators and teachers,32 but any action 
taken must be “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”33  
Therefore, as long as these two requirements are met, educators may 
exercise editorial control over the style and content of student speech 
without violating the First Amendment.34   
[10] The standards of substantial disruption, lewdness, and curriculum 
set the stage for student Internet speech cases.  Without a new and clearer 
standard, these cases serve as the only guidelines for lower courts to 
adjudicate student speech cases relating to the Internet. 
II.  CASE STUDIES: APPLICATION OF PRE-INTERNET STANDARDS TO  
TWO STUDENT INTERNET SPEECH CASES 
[11] In accordance with the growth of the Internet, more and more 
student speech cases involve student speech that takes place on this 
relatively new intangible medium.  Because the Supreme Court has not 
specifically addressed how the mainstream use of the Internet by students 
modifies pre-Internet law, courts stick with and even reinvent the 
standards of Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier.  To determine whether the 
First Amendment protects a student’s speech in cyberspace courts will 
focus on the level of disruption caused by the student speech (Tinker), the 
lewdness of student speech (Fraser), or whether the student speech is part 
 
                                                                                                                         
32
 Id. at 270 (explaining that the newspaper is part of a school curriculum because it had 
always been a part of the educational curriculum and a regular classroom activity). But cf. 
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1372 (8th Cir. 1986) (explaining that 
the newspaper was a public forum “because it was intended to be and operated as a 
conduit for student viewpoint,” covering topics of student interest). 
33
 Id. at 271. 
34
 Id. (explaining that activities such as “school-sponsored publications, theatrical 
productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the 
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school . . . may fairly be 
characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional 
classroom setting . . .”); id. at 273. 
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of the school curriculum (Kuhlmeier).35  Although these three standards 
have set the stage for student Internet speech cases, this section argues that 
a new and clearer definition of the scope of students’ freedom of speech 
rights is needed by contrasting two 1998 student Internet speech cases, 
Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District36 and J.S. v. Bethlehem Area 
School District.37  
A . BEUSSINK V. WOODLAND R-IV SCHOOL DISTRICT 
[12] During his senior year at Woodland High School in Missouri, 
Brandon Beussink created a website on his home computer during his own 
time.38  Brandon’s website was very critical of Woodland High School’s 
administration,39 using “vulgar language to convey his opinion regarding 
the teachers, the principal and the school’s own homepage.”40  Beyond 
stating an opinion, Bandon’s website “invited readers to contact the school 
principal and communicate their opinions regarding Woodland High 
School.”41 
[13] After a classmate, Amanda Brown, was invited to view the website 
on Brandon’s home computer, the two had an argument.42  Amanda 
subsequently accessed Brandon’s website at school and brought it to the 
attention of a teacher, who then notified the principal.43  The principal, 
 
                                                                                                                         
35
 See, e.g., Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp.2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 
2000) (discussing the three standards and using them for guidance). 
36
 30 F. Supp.2d 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1998). 
37
 807 A.2d 847. 
38
 Beussink, 30 F. Supp.2d. at 1177. 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id. 
41
 Id. 
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. at 1177-78. 
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upset that a student had displayed Brandon’s website in a classroom, 
initially suspended Brandon for five days; however, he later increased the 
suspension to ten days.44  Furthermore, Woodland High School 
maintained a policy which lowered “students’ grades by one letter grade 
for each unexcused absence in excess of ten days.”45  Due to a 
combination of prior unexcused absences and serving the suspension of 
ten days, Brandon was failing all of his classes.46 
[14] During trial, the Beussink court did not find “evidence of a 
disturbance” because there was “only one other student in the room” when 
Amanda showed Brandon’s website to the computer teacher and that 
“student did not view the screen.”47  It was also determined that although 
other students viewed the website on-campus the same day, the computer 
teacher had “granted them permission to do so.”48  Applying the Tinker 
standard, the Beussink court concluded that the school’s punishment of 
Brandon violated his free speech rights under the First Amendment 
because, even though students discussed the incident at school, Brandon’s 
website did not substantially interfere with school administration.49 
B.  J.S. V. BETHLEHEM AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT 
[15] Justin Swidler, an eighth grader at Nitschmann Middle School in 
Pennsylvania, also developed a website on his home computer during his 
own time.50  Justin named the website “Teacher Sux.”  It contained 
extremely “derogatory, profane, offensive and threatening comments” 
 
                                                                                                                         
44
 Id. at 1178-79. 
45
 Id. at 1179-80. 
46
 Id. 
47
 Id. at 1178. 
48
 Id. 
49
 See id. at 1180. 
50
 J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 850 (Pa. 2002). 
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about both his algebra teacher, Mrs. Kathleen Fulmer, and his school’s 
principal, Mr. A. Thomas Kartsotis.51  After creating the website, Justin 
openly bragged about it and showed it to the other students at school.52  
An anonymous e-mail subsequently reported the website to a teacher at 
the school, who immediately informed the principal.53  At the end of the 
school year, the school district expelled Justin permanently.54   
[16] According to the record, after viewing the website Mrs. Fulmer 
claimed that she sustained “stress, anxiety, loss of appetite, loss of sleep, 
loss of weight, . . . short-term memory loss, . . . an inability to go out of 
the house and mingle with crowds, . . . headaches and a general sense of 
loss of well being,”55 rendering her temporarily incapable of fulfilling her 
duties as a teacher.56  Her condition was so severe it required her to be 
medicated57 and resulted in her taking medical leave for the entirety of the 
following school year.58  Additionally, it was claimed that Justin’s website 
 
                                                                                                                         
51
 Id. at 851. For example, one page on the website, stated that Mrs. Fulmer was a “bitch” 
and should be fired for “show[ing] off her fat fucking legs.”  J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. 
Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 416 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).  Elsewhere on the site, Justin combined 
pictures of Mrs. Fulmer with images and quotes from the cartoon “South Park” which 
said: “She’s a bigger bitch than your mom.”  J.S., 807 A.2d at 851.  “Yet another page 
morphed a picture of Mrs. Fulmer’s face into that of Adolph Hitler and stated ‘The new 
Fulmer Hitler movie. The similarities astound me.’”  Id.  More controversial pictures 
depicted “Mrs. Fulmer with her head cut off and blood dripping from her neck” and told 
visitors to “take a look at the diagram and the reasons I gave, then give me $20 to help 
pay for the hitman.”  Id. 
52
 J.S., 807 A.2d at 852. 
53
 J.S., 757 A.2d at 415. 
54
 J.S., 807 A.2d at 853. 
55
 Id. at 852. 
56
 Id. at 869. 
57
 Id. at 852. 
58
 Id. at 869. 
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“had a demoralizing impact on the school community.”59  According to 
the principal, “the effect was worse than anything that he had encountered 
in forty years of education.”60 
[17] The J.S. court applied both the Fraser and Tinker standards, 
ultimately finding in favor of the school.61  When applying the Fraser 
standard, the court found that Justin’s “punishment for the use of lewd, 
vulgar and plainly offensive language, including the personal attacks on 
Mrs. Fulmer and Principal Kartsotis, fits easily within Fraser's upholding 
of discipline for speech that undermines the basic function of a public 
school.”62  Given Mrs. Fulmer’s impaired physical and mental health and 
her absence, which “adversely impacted the educational environment,” 
when applying Tinker, the court also determined that Justin’s punishment 
comported with the First Amendment because his website caused a 
substantial disruption to the operation of the school.63  Accordingly, the 
court upheld the school district’s permanent expulsion with “little 
difficulty.”64   
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  THE SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION STANDARD APPLIED TO  
STUDENT INTERNET SPEECH 
[18] Tinker’s substantial disruption standard is inadequate for student 
Internet speech cases for two reasons.  First, the standard is difficult to 
apply because it provides little guidance to school officials to determine 
 
                                                                                                                         
59
 Id. at 852. 
60
 Id. 
61
 Id. at 867-68. 
62
 Id. at 868. 
63
 Id. at 869. 
64
 Id. 
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what constitutes a sufficient disruption to warrant school punishment.65  
While most would agree that “[e]ducators should refrain from disciplining 
students for creating webpages that fall on the relatively innocuous end of 
the content spectrum,” without clearer standards it is difficult to determine 
which types of student Internet speech “reach the level of harmfulness or 
offensiveness that warrant school censorship.”66  Second, “the substantial 
disruption test grants school officials and courts too much leeway to 
restrict protected student speech,” and “the imprecision of the standard 
threatens impermissibly to chill the speech of students who may fear that 
their expression will lead to punishment.”67 
[19] Contrasting Beussink and J.S. illustrates the difficulty in reaching a 
consistent conclusion about what constitutes a substantial disruption. The 
Beussink court, consistent with Tinker’s instruction that disliking or being 
upset by the content of a student speech is not an acceptable justification 
for limiting student speech, concluded that the school’s disciplinary 
actions violated Brandon’s First Amendment rights because they were 
based on the principal’s immediate distress upon seeing Brandon’s 
website and not on a reasonable fear of disruption with school discipline.68  
By also relying on Tinker, however, the J.S. court found the school’s 
disciplinary actions did not violate Justin’s First Amendment rights 
 
                                                                                                                         
65
 See Note, Administrative Regulation of the High School Press, 83 MICH. L. REV. 625, 
636-39 (1984). 
66
 Rhoda J. Yen, Free Speech on the Internet: Regulating Web Authorship by Students, 
2000 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 61, 65 (2000) (“While such sites are obviously 
distressing to those being targeted, they contain merely personal impressions and 
opinions, which have traditionally been strongly protected under the First Amendment.”). 
67
 Alexander G. Tuneski, Note, Online, Not on Grounds: Protecting Student Internet 
Speech, 89 VA. L. REV. 139, 170 (2003). 
68
 Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp.2d. 1175, 1180-82 (E.D. Mo. 
1998). 
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because the website disrupted the school by causing morale problems in 
the school.69   
[20] The J.S. court relied heavily on the principal’s testimony that 
Justin’s website had a “demoralizing impact on the school community.”70  
But the J.S. opinion is void of details of such an impact.  In fact, it 
indicates the lack thereof: 
 During this time, [Justin] continued to attend classes 
and participate in extra-curricular activities, including a 
band trip.  The School District did not request that [Justin] 
remove the site.  Evidently, [Justin], on his own, removed 
the web site approximately one week after [the principal] 
became aware of the site.  Moreover, the School District 
took no action to confront or to punish [Justin] in any 
manner during the remainder of the school year.  Finally, 
the School District did not refer [Justin] for any type of 
psychological evaluation and did not request that his 
parents have any such evaluation conducted.71 
[21] A distinction between the two cases based on the negative effects 
they had on the “listeners” cannot be drawn.  Like Justin’s website, which 
caused a viewer, Mrs. Fulmer, to complain of a plethora of physical and 
psychological symptoms,72 Brandon’s website also had negative effects on 
the computer teacher who saw his website.73  Upon reading the content of 
Brandon’s website, the computer teacher became very upset and 
 
                                                                                                                         
69
 J.S., 807 A.2d at 869. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court finding is consistent with that 
of the Commonwealth Court. See J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 417 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000). 
70
 J.S., 807 A.2d at 852. 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id. 
73
 Beussink, 30 F. Supp.2d at 1178. 
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immediately brought it to the attention of the principal.74  The principal 
later testified that, when the computer teacher came to him, he could tell 
by her demeanor and rapid speech that she was obviously agitated.75  
Specifically, he believed the computer teacher was offended by Brandon’s 
website.76  The principal himself was also distressed that other students 
had viewed its content.77   
[22] One may defend this inconsistency by arguing that Justin’s website 
is more disruptive than Brandon’s because, while Brandon’s website 
generally “convey[ed] his opinion regarding the teachers, the principal and 
the school's own homepage,”78 Justin’s website specifically targeted his 
math teacher, Mrs. Fulmer, and the principal, Mr. Kartsotis.79  Other 
student Internet speech cases would not support such reasoning. 
[23] For example, in Layschock v. Hermitage School District,80 a 
Pennsylvania court found a high school lacked the authority for 
disciplining a seventeen year-old student for creating an unflattering 
“parody profile” of the principal on MySpace.81  The court concluded that 
the school failed to establish a sufficient nexus “between [the student]’s 
speech and a substantial disruption of the school environment.”82  In 
another case, a Washington judge ruled in favor of a high school student 
holding that a website ridiculing the assistant principal was not 
 
                                                                                                                         
74
 Id. 
75
 Id. 
76
 Id. 
77
 Id. 
78
 Id. at 1177. 
79
 J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 851 (Pa. 2002). 
80
 496 F. Supp.2d 587, 606 (W.D. Pa. 2007). 
81
 Id. at 601. 
82
 Id. at 600. 
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substantially disruptive.83  In yet another case, an Ohio judge ordered the 
reinstatement of a student who the school had suspended for creating a 
webpage critical of his band teacher.84  Because the student created the 
webpage at home, the school administrators admitted the punishment was 
a mistake, and the case settled before trial.85  Commentators have 
remarked, “[s]ites . . . which feature insults against a teacher, do not reach 
the level of harmfulness or offensiveness that warrant school 
censorship.”86  “While such sites are obviously distressing to those being 
targeted, they contain merely personal impressions and opinions, which 
have traditionally been strongly protected under the First Amendment.”87 
[24] Arguably, without an actual threat to Mrs. Fulmer’s life, her 
response to Justin’s website was neither rational nor foreseeable.88  
Establishing a “standard of First Amendment protection on the reaction of 
listeners threatens to abridge far more speech than is constitutionally 
permissible.”89  Therefore, punishing students “anytime that a teacher is 
upset by the magnitude and strength of the student's off-campus criticism” 
only reduces the students’ freedom of speech.90   
 
                                                                                                                         
83
 See Joshua Robin, Judge Upholds Student Who Posted Web Parody, SEATTLE TIMES, 
July 19, 2000, at B5, available at http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/ 
archive/?date=20000719&slug=4032527. Among other things, Beidler allegedly placed 
in phony ads for Viagra the superimposed images of the assistant principal having sex 
with Homer Simpson, a television cartoon character. See id. 
84
 See Mark Rollenhagen, Westlake Schools to Pay $30,000 to Settle Net Suit, PLAIN 
DEALER, Apr. 14, 1998, at 1A. 
85
 Id. O'Brien's webpage included a photo of his band teacher and characterized him as 
“an overweight middle-age man who doesn't like to get haircuts.” Id. 
86
 Yen, supra note 66, at 65. 
87
 Id. 
88
 Tuneski, supra note 67, at 171. 
89
 Id. at 172. 
90
 Id. at 171-72.  
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[25] By contrast, the Beussink court found Brandon’s discipline 
impermissible because it was merely based on the principal’s distress upon 
viewing Brandon’s website rather than a potential disruption to the 
administration of the school.91  It has been argued that this conclusion, 
however, is “not a question of law, but opinion.”92  As one scholar has 
noted, it is not the reaction to the content of a website that matters, “but 
rather to its disruptive effect on the effective governance of the school 
environment.”93   
[26] Knowledge of the Internet speech on the part of school members 
does not explain why the Beussink court concluded that “classes are not 
materially or substantially disrupted” while the J.S. court found the 
contrary.94  As in J.S., students, faculty, and administrators at Brandon’s 
school were all aware of his website.95  Arguably, the disruption arose in 
Beussink when students viewing Brandon’s website were instructed to 
leave the site.96  After all, “minor attention problems in classrooms [have] 
been considered . . . substantial disruption.”97  In fact, “nearly any 
controversial or offensive expression that stirs debate or humors students 
 
                                                                                                                         
91
 See Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp.2d. 1175, 1182 (E.D. Mo. 
1998). 
92
 Louis John Seminski, Jr., Note, Tinkering With Student Free Speech: The Internet and 
the Need for a New Standard, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 165, 177 (2001). 
93
 Id. 
94
 Beussink, 30 F. Supp.2d at 1178. 
95
 Compare Beussink, 30 F. Supp.2d. at 1177-78 (describing how Beussink allowed 
various people to use his home computer and showed the homepage website), with J.S. v. 
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 851-52 (Pa. 2002) (“[S]tudents, faculty and 
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could cause enough of a classroom interruption to satisfy the substantial 
disruption test.”98 
[27] A review of J.S., Beussink, and other relevant case law shows that 
the substantial disruption standard, being indefinite, vague, flexible, and 
easily satisfied, can be used by overzealous school officials to justify 
punishing students for a wide array of their expression, even those that 
occurred off-campus.  Furthermore, this standard provides courts with 
wide discretion with which to manipulate the standard to reach a desired 
conclusion.  As noted by one scholar, whether or not courts abuse this 
discretion, “applying the substantial disruption test to off-campus speech 
threatens to abridge speech” rights in “otherwise fully protected forums.”99 
B.  THE LEWDNESS STANDARD APPLIED TO STUDENT INTERNET SPEECH 
[28] The lewdness standard set out by Fraser has not proven to be 
dispositive for deciding student Internet speech cases.  While the J.S. court 
found it permissible for the school to restrict Justin’s Internet speech 
because it was lewd and offensive,100 the Beussink court found it 
impermissible for the school to restrict Brandon’s Internet speech, even 
though it was similarly “crude and vulgar.”101  Not only is it difficult to 
decipher from the record that Justin’s website is, as a matter of law, more 
vulgar than Brandon’s, but the J.S. court may have exceeded Fraser’s 
lewdness standard “by applying the rationale to speech originating away 
from school or a school-sponsored event.”102 
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C.  THE SCHOOL CURRICULUM STANDARD APPLIED TO  
STUDENT INTERNET SPEECH 
[29] As alluded to above, Kuhlmeier’s school curriculum standard is 
difficult to apply to student speech that occurs on the Internet.103  The 
difficulty lies in the amorphous distinction between on-campus and off-
campus student speech.  While the Beussink court avoided addressing the 
issue of whether a website that was created on a home computer outside of 
school hours but viewed at school is an “on-campus” speech, the trial 
court in J.S., the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, found it “evident 
that the courts have allowed school officials to discipline students for 
conduct occurring off of school premises where it is established that the 
conduct materially and substantially interferes with the educational 
process.”104  And yet, the appellate court in J.S., the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, found “a sufficient nexus between [Justin’s] web site and 
the school campus” because Justin’s website was “aimed at a specific 
school and/or its personnel [and] brought onto the school campus or 
accessed at school by its originator.”105  Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
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 See supra Part I.C. 
104
 J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 421(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000). 
105
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 [T]he record clearly reflects that the off-campus web site was 
accessed by J.S. at school and was shown to a fellow student. While it 
is less certain exactly what portions of the web site the student viewed, 
J.S., nevertheless, facilitated the on-campus nature of the speech by 
accessing the web site on a school computer in a classroom, showing 
the site to another student, and by informing other students at school of 
the existence of the web site. Related thereto, faculty members and the 
school administration also accessed the web site at school. Importantly, 
the web site was aimed not at a random audience, but at the specific 
audience of students and others connected with this particular School 
District; Mrs. Fulmer and [the principal] were the subjects of the site. 
See id. at 864 n.11 (noting that “purely off-campus speech may . . . be subject to 
punishment by [the] school district if [the substantial disruption test] of Tinker [is] 
satisfied.”). 
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therefore determined it was “inevitable” that a website created off-campus 
“would pass from students to teachers” on-campus.106  Without a clearer 
distinction between what constitutes on-campus and off-campus speech, 
courts will continue to be divided. 
D.  DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
[30] Student Internet speech jurisprudence has two “spins”: the Internet 
spin and the school spin.  On the one hand, by focusing only on the 
Internet spin, one would argue that student Internet speech, being Internet 
speech all the same, is protected by the First Amendment under Reno.107  
On the other hand, by focusing only on the school spin, one would argue 
that student Internet speech, being student speech all the same, is subject 
to regulation by the school under Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier.   
[31] But those who see the Internet as a technological advance in 
communication, offering an “opportunity for robust, uninhibited self-
expression”108 would argue that students’ expression over the Internet, 
whether it be “cathartic expressions of their frustrations or artistic 
sensibilities,” should be protected by the First Amendment because the 
Internet is editor-less, interactive, and allows for students to express their 
views and ideas anonymously without fear of an “official retaliation, 
social ostracism, [or] an invasion of privacy.”109  Some commentators 
argue that First Amendment protections “must necessarily extend” to 
student expression over the Internet to “ensure every citizen of his or her 
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individual rights and to foster the growth and improvement of our 
government and society.”110 
[32] If schools can prohibit students from making substantially 
disruptive and/or lewd speech on-campus or in a school newspaper, they 
should similarly be able to impose their discretion on student speech on 
the Internet that has a foreseeable disruptive effect on campus ground.  
Given that dissemination of information on the Internet is both immediate 
and pervasive, an e-mail, a website, or a blog could potentially create 
more disturbance on school grounds than can a conversation between two 
students in the school cafeteria.  If schools do not need to “tolerate student 
speech that is inconsistent with [their] basic educational mission” on-
campus or in a school newspaper, then it makes little sense to require 
schools to tolerate student speech that occurred in a different and more 
injurious forum.111 
[33] Courts have resorted to the “off-campus” defense to counter this 
argument.112  The “off-campus” defense assumes that student Internet 
speech is off-campus speech and, therefore, should be subject to a higher 
level of First Amendment protection.113   
[34] Because the Supreme Court has never articulated standards 
regarding how much authority a school may assert over off-campus 
student expression, however, a lack of guidance has led to inconsistent 
conclusions among the lower courts.  On one end of the campus property 
spectrum, some courts have concluded that “school officials are powerless 
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to impose sanctions for expression” that occurred off of school 
property.114  On the other end of the spectrum, some courts115 have 
concluded that “when the bounds of decency are violated in publications 
distributed to high school students, whether on campus or off campus, the 
offenders become subject to discipline.”116  But scholars have warned that 
such conclusions are overreaching by granting schools the authority to 
discipline students who create websites at home.117   
[35] There are also those who are somewhere in the middle of this 
campus property spectrum.  These scholars suggest scrutinizing the 
physical location of the computer or server receiving the Internet speech118 
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or the foreseeability of an Internet speech reaching the school119 to 
determine whether or not student Internet speech is on-campus or off-
campus. 
[36] One solution “to protect the First Amendment rights of students, 
courts should establish a clear rule that off-campus speech is not subject to 
the jurisdiction of school officials.”120  To make this restriction effective, a 
clear line must be drawn between on-campus and off-campus speech.121  
Rather than focus on the physical place of reception of a website or an e-
mail or how foreseeable it is that the Internet speech would arrive on 
school grounds, courts should focus on the student author’s role in 
publicizing or disseminating the website to demarcate the reach of 
schools’ authority.122  “By taking this additional step, a speaker decides 
whether she wishes to subject herself to the jurisdiction of school 
officials.”123  “Such steps would include opening a web page at school, 
telling others to view the site from school, distributing a [printed version] 
as students enter school, and sending e-mail to school accounts.”124  By 
contrast, merely posting a website or comments on the Internet would be a 
passive act that is insufficient for categorization as on-campus speech that 
is subject to a school’s censorship.  “If the author does not take steps to 
encourage the dissemination at school, it can be presumed that the author 
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intended the speech which originated off-campus to be viewed and 
received off-campus.”125   
[37] Finally, prohibiting schools from punishing students for their 
strictly off-campus speech would not turn schools into “madhouses of 
chaos” because alternative means of regulating student speech within 
schools are sufficient to maintain the proper order and decorum of the 
learning environment.126  For example, the Supreme Court recognizes that 
the Fourteenth Amendment gives parents a broad power in the “care, 
custody, and management of [their] children.”127  Of course, there are 
always the threats of civil and criminal prosecutions to keep the 
miscreants in line too.128   
CONCLUSION 
[38] As the Internet is now an essential part of the everyday lives of 
students, more and more student speech cases that the lower courts are 
dealing with today involve Internet speech.  Yet, the three pre-Internet 
standards of Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier set out by the Supreme Court 
have proven to be inadequately vague for this new and unique medium of 
communication. 
[39] Drawing a bright line between on-campus speech and Internet 
speech would provide better guidelines for courts and school officials on 
the scope of the First Amendment.  It is suggested that courts should focus 
on the role of the student author of that Internet speech in disseminating 
the content of that speech on-campus to determine whether a student 
speech that occurred on the Internet is subject to the school’s discretion.  If 
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a student takes a purposeful step to direct their speech towards the school, 
then that student’s speech should be subject to the school’s jurisdiction.   
[40] Punishing students for the e-mails or websites they created off-
campus during their own time poses an intolerable threat to the First 
Amendment rights of students.  Such a threat cannot be justified by the 
need to maintain order in the schools as there are alternative methods to 
punish offensive speech and deter school disruptions. 
